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FIONA PROBYN-RAPSEY 
Paternalism and Complicity: 
Or How Not to Atone 
for the 'Sins of the Father' 
T 
HE cultural politics of Australian colonialism revolve around discourses of 
paternalism and the ' protection' of Aboriginal people. Understanding how 
paternalism reproduces itself transgenerationally, and between whites and 
Aboriginal people, between subordinated groups, between women, is one way to 
approach its limits. Starting with this premise, I examine the ways in which 
paternalism reproduces itself, such that even today white paternalistic attitudes 
towards Aboriginal people and culture are pervasive. I focus here on Mary Ellen 
Jordan ' s Australian memoir Balanda: My Year in Arnhem Land (2005), which is 
critical of, and complicit with, the biopolitical power of paternalism and its 
accompanying rhetoric of 'protection ' . I read this memoir within the context of a 
broader, shifting genealogy of protection within Australian cultural history, teasing 
out some of the implications of the capacity of paternalism to mutate and to retain its 
cultural and political influence. 
In Jordan ' s memoir, a young white Australian woman working for a community 
cultural centre in Maningrida, a remote Aboriginal conununity in Arnhem Land, 
becomes increasingly sceptical of her role as white ' protector' of Aboriginal culture. 
The memoir traces her growing resentment at what she calls the 'protection racket' 
that whites offer Aboriginal people. 
1 In her view this ' protection' is self-serving 
because it fails to protect Aboriginal people from white domination, while it stymies 
Aboriginal 'self determination' . In Jordan 's judgement, the 'protection racket' in 
Maningrida in fact gives more opportunities to whites than to Aboriginal people, as 
well as entrenching poverty in the Aboriginal community. When she expresses her 
views to another white resident he replies, 'When you ' re a bit older and you 've been 
around as long as me, you' 11 realise that these people have to be protected from 
themselves ' (206) . Jordan comes to believe that the ' threat ' to the community does 
not come from within but from white paternalism. 
In Maningrida, Jordan is ' in a world that seemed utterly foreign to me' (21), and 
feels like she had 'never been part of such a small minority before - there were 100-
150 Balandas [non-indigenous] in a community of around 1500' (18) . She had 
'expected the community to be a mish-mash of black and white - but in fact there 
was a sharp social divide' (8) . She is offended at the first dinner party she is invited 
I There are echoes of Judith Stiehm . See her Women and Men 's Wars (New York : Pergamon , 1983) 
and Arms and !he Enlis1ed Women (Philadelphia : Temp le UP, 1989). 
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to, where another Balanda tells her that the place is a good one 'as long as you don't 
have to mix with the locals' (36). On the whole, Jordan finds those holding such 
explicitly racist views are outnumbered by people who have what she describes as a 
'positive' racism of romanticisation: 'In Balanda thinking, Aboriginal people could 
be elevated and mythologised in a way that seemed to take away their status as real 
people' (147). The consequence is that their 'failure' to live up to the romantic 
image opens up the possibility for discrimination. Beth Povinelli's argument about 
the image that underpins Native Title Legislation supports this view: she observes 
that the love of the 'traditional' Aboriginal constructs Aboriginal people as ' failures 
of ... the very identity that identifies them' (29). 
The discourse of 'self-determination' has, from the 1970s, been the dominant 
rhetoric of Aboriginal governance. Jordan had been expecting a community which 
functioned according to this idea (9) because it had been founded on 'post-Whitlam 
ideals of land rights and self-determination' (92). Instead, she found that things 
'rarely ran in an Aboriginal way in Maningrida. I had expected to be surrounded by 
the exotic, but instead I was enmeshed in white bureaucracy, a jungle of Latinate 
tenns like acquit, triplicate and application ' (91) . For her, the measure of the success 
of self-determination would be separation, 'rupture', a tern1 Tim Rowse uses in his 
critique of the policy: 'people are being asked to be self-detennining within social 
fom1s bequeathed by an era of"assimilation." The resources they have to work with, 
both material and rhetorical, are too far rooted in our shared pasts to justify 
celebrations of rupture with the bad old days' (1 0). 
In her critique of the protection racket, Jordan taps into one of Australian 
colonialism's key concepts. Protection - paternalism's key term - is deeply em-
bedded in white thinking when it comes to Aboriginality. 
2 
Balanda illustrates the 
way in which growing up white involves the accumulation of paternalistic attitudes 
towards Aboriginal people, as if it is built into the very fabric of the subject position 
'white Australian'. It is important to note that this is not, in any simple sense, a 
conservative attitude, but informs liberal attitudes as well. Talking to her friend in 
Melbourne, Jordan recounts: 
We had talked a lot about Aboriginal issues over the years, trying to figure out what we 
thought, what was right and what ought to be done. We had worked out a framework 
2 The Australian colonies were quick to make ' Protection' a bureaucratic preoccupation. ' Protectors' 
of Aborigines- and the word is most frequently in scare quotes to signal its deadly irony- were 
appointed in South Australia (founded in 1835) and Victoria ( 1838). George Augustus Robinson 
was the first Chief Protector of the Port Philip District in 1839 and more famously Protector of 
Aborigines in Tasmania. Official Protectors were appointed much later in Queensland (1897; see 
Rosalind Kidd, Th e Way We Civilise: Aboriginal Affairs - the Untold StOIJ' [St Lucia, Qld: U of 
Queensland P, 1997]. p. 13) and New South Wales , which appointed its first official protector in 
1881 . This position was abolished with the introduction of the NSW Aborigines Protection Act 
/909- 1943 which established the Aborigines Protection Board, renamed the Aborigines Welfare 
Board in 1943. The Protection Boards were set up to monitor and regulate the lives, including 
marriages, births, work and residence of Aboriginal people and those associated with them. 
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for understanding Aboriginal issues that was typical of the young, left wing, social-
justice-oriented people we knew. It was clear to us that because Aboriginal people had 
been wronged by the white invasion, the Australian government ought to give them as 
much money as it would take to fix or alleviate the problems that colonisation had 
caused. The social problems like domestic violence and alcohol abuse, health problems 
like diabetes and heart disease, economic problems, language loss- all of these should 
be tackled by government programs, because we owed it to Aboriginal people. Before I 
went to Maningrida, it hadn ' t occurred to me that ' solutions ' that came from the 
outside would be so ineffective. (88- 89) 
Jordan describes the way in which a paternalistic relationship to Aboriginality 
fonned an anchor for her white identity and her politics. She describes herself as 
having a 'strong but unfocussed social conscience' (160) , which is supplemented by 
a 'medley of white guilt, ignorance and earnest but unfocussed respect' (185). 
In the face of a subordinated community Jordan initially sees some direction for 
herself, recounting that she had felt that the Aboriginal community in Maningrida 
needed protection from non-indigenous culture: 'we thought that Aboriginal cultures 
were intrinsically worth preserving. By taking on the Balanda aspects of their lives 
for them, we wanted to protect Aboriginal people from contamination by the 
dominant culture' (91). 'Contamination' means the decline of traditional cultures; 
'decline' is a key tern1 for inviting protection: 
I had come to Maningrida with similar romanticised perceptions, thinking that 
Aboriginal cultures and languages could remain intact, maybe even thrive, if only they 
were protected by a buffer of benevolent white people. I thought that it was appropriate 
for Balandas to do the work, because the role of 'being Aboriginal' was important and 
significant in itself, and should not be impinged on by Balanda style work. (148-49) 
This rhetoric gets to the heart of the paradox of protection: to protect from the thing 
that one is is not protection so much as a confirmation of domination. 
In the context of feminist readings of women's subordination, Wendy Brown 
notes that 'to be "protected" by the very same power whose violation one fears 
perpetuates the very modality of dependence and powerlessness' (170). Jordan 
comes to see 'protection ' in similar terms, and reconfigures her 'good intentions' as 
'wounding' (91) . Later, she says, 'our good intentions were patronising, and ... our 
underlying assumptions about Aboriginal people reinforced their passive position 
and our right to make decisions on their behalf (148-49). This critique renders 
Jordan 's text postcolonial rather than colonial, for it is both critical of and complicit 
with past practices. 
What is fascinating about this memoir is that Jordan locates ' the problems ' 
afflicting the conununity within the discourse of ' protection' , whilst continuing to 
occupy a paternalistic position, often speaking ' in the best interests' of those who do 
not speak: ' Sometimes I felt that the best I could say of the role of Balandas in 
Maningrida was that we were paternalistic. The worst was that the system we 
worked within prevented Aboriginal people from taking responsibility for 
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themselves and their communities' (218- 19). The memoir identifies paternalism as a 
condition of the recent past- 'we were paternalistic', 'were patronising', 'reinforced 
their passive position ' - but shows that the patemalism remains . The paternalism 
manifests in Jordan's diagnosis of the failures of 'self determination ', though 
positioned primarily as a failed white policy, relies on a reading of Aboriginal 
'failure-to-be-self-detennining' within terms set by and understood by whites. To 
put it another way, Jordan, as a white woman, is not in a strong position to judge the 
success or failures of self-detemlination for Aboriginal people, and each time she 
protests the domination of the system she works within, she reiterates a paternalist 
position, a paradox that the policy of 'self-determination' sets up. Noel Pearson 's 
work is cited as support for her observations, but we hear little from the people that 
the system fails. It could be argued that this silence reflects the nature of their 
subordination, but it is more the case that patemalism structures that engagement in 
the first place; as such, Jordan's reference to Pearson, a paternalist of a different sort 
from within the Cape York communit)', is apt and unsurprising. They are both 
disappointed with the lack of difference, the lack of a rupture between the 'bad old 
days' (pre-Land rights , citizenship rights) and the creation of welfare systems 
designed to support communities. 
By and large the memoir does not engage with the question of how Jordan 's view 
might differ from the views of the Aboriginal people with whom she works. 
However, the epilogue provides a potentially different perspective on the protection 
racket she describes. Jordan recounts Valerie 'mimicking the way Balandas reacted 
to her, and then she laughed her head off. I remembered looking at her in 
astonishment. She was playing with the notion of Aboriginal mystique. She knew 
what the Balandas thought about her, and about themselves: she was onto us ' (220).
3 
Jordan's look of astonishment, as well as the realisation that 'she was onto us' , end 
the book and also challenge it, being two of very few indications that the passivity 
and dependency Jordan diagnoses could be read differently. Ending here, the 
ramifications of Valerie's rnimicry are foreclosed, protecting paternalism from the 
implications of its dependency on the 'helped'. Had this 'astonishment' come 
earlier, it rnight have provoked dialogue on a different plane, not of failure but of 
'response-ability' and a reconsideration of different types of dependency, including 
dependency as a condition of sociality and subjectivity.
4 
3 'M imicry', Homi Bhabha has noted in 'Of Mimicry and Man', is a powerful subversion of colonial 
power where the colonised comes to ·resemble but menace' the colonisers ( 127). It works on the 
basis of unsettling the coloniser's presumption that the colonised are, and aspire to be, easily read 
and positioned within the colonial hierarchy. 
4 Jordan 's 'astonishment' at seeing Valerie 's ' play' is the astonishment of the writer who, in telling 
the 'history of the Other' is 'pushed against the limits of ... [her] own' (Sara Suleri, The Rhetoric of 
English India [Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1992) , p. 2). The style of the memoir, in proceeding 
towards a political argument about self-determination rather than offering a meditation on 
whiteness or intercultural dialogue, shuts down what this scene might have opened up. 
95 
FIONA PROBYN-RAPSEY 
Dependence needs to be rethought, not in ten11S of its 'familial ' or patemalistic 
structure of parent/child - a process in which the 'subjectivity ' of the latter is fanned 
in relation to the former - but as a relationship between different subjectivities in an 
intercultural dialogue. Kelly Oliver writes, 
the ethical subject as witnessing subjectivity acknowledges her dependence upon her 
addressee and interlocutor whom she cannot possess but upon whom she is absolutely 
dependent for her very subjectivity. This moment is the moment of ethical self-
consciousness for the witnessing subject. It is the moment in which the subject realises 
that an ethical obligation to others is built into the condition of possibility for 
subjectivity. (325) 
Subject positions always qualify the potential of ethical relationships. In Australia, 
the subject position of the white woman is still coded in terms of the 'helper' and, 
according to Aileen Moreton-Robinson, is still largely unconsciously complicit with 
white colonialism. Jordan 's text a1mounces a missed opportunity to extend a critique 
of protection to a critique of structures of colonialism and whiteness itself. 
Tim Rowse 's White Flour, White Power argues that the system of rationing did 
not simply accompany the colonial relationship, but articulated it. Consequently, 
Rowse finds that "'pauperism" is one of the central concepts of Australian 
colonialism' (40), and that such descriptions became prescriptive. He points out that 
the term 'pauper' is a ' tem1 of moral and political disapproval , used by would-be 
helpers to describe the lack of co-operation of the poor with philanthropy's 
conditions' (40) . In their genealogy of dependency, American critics Nancy Fraser 
and Linda Gordon find that in post-industrial societies dependency is 'feminized and 
racialized; the new psychological meanings have strong feminine associations, while 
currents once associated with the native and slave are increasingly inflecting the 
discourse about welfare' (25). Such a critique seems pertinent to Jordan 's and 
Pearson's concems about passive welfare protection: Jordan writes , 'Aboriginal 
people were making us indispensable: they had no intention of taking on our jobs 
and worries when there was no earthly need to do so' (95). On this basis, she 
worries about a time in the future when 
the government funding was cut, or when for some reason there were no Balandas 
willing to come to Amhem Land and do the community ' s work for it. Most of the 
Aboriginal people there had never known a time without a benevolent Balanda 
presence in their li ves, and without the flo w of government money into their hands . 
(95) 
In the critique and description of passivity there is also prescription: ' they had never 
knaW11 '. But presumably ' they' know things other than what Jordan knows about 
them, as Valerie's mimicry suggests. 
My concem here, though, is not to focus on arguing against the political trajectory 
of the memoir and its echoes of Noel Pearson 's Our Right to Take Responsibility, 
nor even in tracing the gaps and silences for altematives to Jordan 's view of the 
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' protection racket'. Rather, what interests me is the ways in which the memoir might 
help to understand how paternalism reproduces itself. As I indicated earlier, the 
question is not the extent to which paternalism pervades Australian culture, but 
understanding its capacity to transmit itself amongst whites, particularly. 
Jordan's desire for liberal-inflected atonement brings her into a paternalistic 
relationship which she initially adheres to: 'We accepted the system that we 
inherited, and assumed that eventually, with education, Aboriginal people would 
step into the jobs now done by Balandas' (92). What interests me is that paternalism 
was, for Jordan, initially a 'good' and therefore accepted or acceptable inheritance, 
while colonialism came to be associated with the 'bad' past and with the 'sins of the 
father'. How did paternalism occupy the space of the 'good ' here? And how does it 
appear to be separate from colonialism, when in fact it is a means by which 
colonialism is articulated? What is the dynamic that allows white Australians to 
reproduce paternalism, still believing themselves to be 'good'? 
To consider this question, we need to consider what kind of 'power' paternalism 
is, and the relationship of that power to more frequently contested forms of colonial 
violence. Paternalism is biopolitical power, or biopower, power that does not kill but 
which cultivates life in particular forn1s (Foucault). Foucault did not complete his 
work in relation to outlining how this system of power operates, but others have 
gone on to define the concept. For the purposes of my reading of Balanda, and 
analysis of Australian colonialism more specifically, I have found the elaboration of 
Foucault's work by Rabinow and Rose to be particularly useful. They describe 
biopolitics as containing the following features: 
Strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life and health, 
initially addressed to populations that may or may not be territorialized upon the 
nation, society or pre-given communities, but may also be specified in terms of 
emergent biosocial collectivities, sometimes specified in terms of categories of race, 
ethnicity, gender or religion. Modes of subjectification, in which individuals can be 
brought to work on themselves, under certain f01ms of authority, in relation to truth 
discourses, by means of practices of the self, in the name of individual or collective life 
or health. (2- 3) 
Paternalism is biopolitical in the sense that it works to focus on the 'health ' of the 
individual, in their best interests, as collective group, even those ambivalently placed 
within the nation. Biopolitics include a positive affirmation of health, life and 
longevity, but this mode is not characteristic of 'settler' or colonial power only, 
which is why Aboriginal leaders inhabit the biopolitical while contesting its 
administration (see Pearson) . 
Paternalism is characterised by domination coupled with love and affection , 
where one party, which assumes superiority, purports to act 'in the best interests ' of 
the subordinate. Its roots are in an image of a family projected onto an institution 
like a sovereign or government. Jack D. Douglas argues that ' maternalism and 
paternalism have always been among the most successful of devices of self-
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presentation by those who wish to influence others ' (172). Paternalism then, as a 
form of power, predicates what George Lakoff sees as 'part of our standard 
conceptual repertoire', which is the 'nation as family'. This trope or metaphor of 
political conununity takes a particularly strong form in colonial societies, where the 
colonised are positioned as children - indeed, Protection boards in Australia often 
made reference to their positioning as acting in loco parentis . The stolen generations 
would have to be the most obvious expression of the 'nation as family' trope in the 
control of Aboriginal people: the State represented children who were parent-less, 
and then could be 'taken' in by the surrogate father state. 
Douglas argues that there is a crucial distinction between what he calls 'genetic 
paternalism' and 'state paternalism', and that 'genetic paternalism is by far the most 
important fonn of sincerely cooperative paternalism' (174). He defines 'genetic 
paternalism' as 'any fonn of paternalism (doing good for others in the name of 
"what is good for them") in which those acting paternally are sincerely acting to 
help the other person become more independently competent over the long run' 
(174). In contrast, ' conflictful paternalism' ' is any form of paternalism that is not 
aimed at the long run independent competence and equality of the submissive 
member of the relation' (174). This is the kind of paternalism that Jordan is so 
disappointed to find in Maningrida's white and Aboriginal relationships. By 
contrast, Mary R. Jackman reads paternalism as ' discrimination without the 
expression of hostility' (10), arguing that the emphasis on 'conflict' in social science 
readings of power inequality often results in scholars overlooking the more subtle 
forms of 'consensual' or even cooperative power. She suggests that there is an 
'inconsistent attitude structure' , of love and domination, ' that lies at its core ' and 
which enhances the ' dominant group 's ability to practice discrimination ' (273) . It is 
this 'inconsistency' and incoherence that makes paternalism so much less likely to 
come under scrutiny than open hostility and violence. 
In the context of these observations, the recent 'History Wars' are of particular 
interest. Debate centres on a dispute over the level of violence by settlers against 
indigenous people. The main antagonists have been the self-published and self-
proclaimed public intellectual Keith Windschuttle, who argues for a 'benign 
colonisation' rather than a violent one, and academic historians like Henry Reynolds 
and Lyndall Ryan, whose work did much to establish (in scholarly terms) the level 
of conflict across Australia. Much of this debate has focused on the frontier violence 
of dispossession, the number of dead, because this , as both sides would agree, 
reflects on the ' national character' , 'who we are as a people '. As Patrick Brantlinger 
points out, 'The history of British Imperialism around the world does not support 
Windschuttle ' s belief that it was mainly benign, or that it was somehow effectively 
restrained by a humanitarian and religious culture on the frontiers in North America, 
Australia and elsewhere' (669). 
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Windschuttle 's arguments, and those of some of his cnt1cs, are based on 
privileging the benevolent practice of colonialism associated with the missions, the 
evangelical protection of 'god's children', over violent dispossession. Paternalism, 
on the other hand, is much less spectacular, much more mundane; it is not about the 
risk of death on the frontier, but the maintenance of life in a particular fom1. As 
Jordan says, ' It wasn't an ochre-coloured frontier adventure for me or my friends or 
colleagues. It was every day life ' (213). So, too, paternalism is about 'everyday life' 
and we miss it if we focus exclusively on the violent frontier as colonialism's 
principal character. While it is tempting to say that protection is a 'lesser evil' 
compared with the physical violence of warfare and indiscriminate killing, the point 
is that biopolitical power recoils at waste of life. Thus, it seeks to maintain it in a 
particular fonn: on a reservation, sober, willing to trade, monogamous, disease free, 
and as knowing British subjects.
5 
As well as the question of genocide, it would be 
fruitful to also consider how colonialism in Australia sought to 'maintain' the life of 
Aboriginal people in particular forn1s, thus rendering suspect any recourse to an 
argument based on a presumed 'benign' colonisation. It is not a matter of genocide 
or protection, but rather a question of genocide and protection. 
The work of feminist philosophers, including most recently Iris Marion Young, 
suggest that the idea that violation precedes protection in a temporal or 
chronological order is wrong because, in a crucial sense, violation and protection 
have a complicated entanglement. The presumption that violence precedes 
protection implies a moral order, with the 'first' kind of violence appearing worse 
than the ' second'. Such thinking, while understandable, underplays the complexity 
of their interdependence, or complicity: in Australian colonialism, protective paternal-
ism controls and enables through controlled proximity to violence. This proximity is 
protection's problem, and its raison d 'etre. It cannot escape the violence it is 
supposed to buffer; it is complicit with what it seeks to ameliorate. Perhaps because 
of this complicity, paternalism might usefully be thought of in tem1s of the 
pharmakon, being simultaneously poison and cure (Derrida). This is the paradox at 
the centre of Jordan 's memoir, which functions as a diagnosis of the problem of 
white paternalism that does not see that such a white diagnosis is not only a cure, but 
also the poison. This paradox brings us back to the issue of paternalism's capacity to 
transmit itself. 
5 On e Chief Protector, Dr Cecil Cook in the Northern Territory ( 1927- 1939) seems to have 
appreciated this complicity. Cook described the role of Protector by reference to the 1864 
expedition from Adelaide into country that is now the Northern Territory. Dr F. E. Goldsmith was 
appointed to ' prevent the affliction of the native people with imported communicable diseases .... 
He was to foster friendly relations and offer inducements to them to work , to encourage trade, and 
to police scrupulous discharge of obligations to them. He was to make them comprehend their 
privileges and responsibilities as British subjects to prevent interference w ith their women or their 
debauchery with liquor, and to control the issue of relief rations ' (560-61 ). 
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Jordan ' s own relationship to her father is significant here. In the middle of her 
memoir, when she is busy attempting to 'atone for the sins of our fathers', her own 
father dies. With this news she experiences some relief, having been estranged from 
him for some years because of the violence of his relationship to the family: 
On hearing the news of his death, my sister told me, one of our other sisters had said to 
another, ' Maybe now we can stop having nightmares.' I put the phone down and 
walked quietly past the dinner table and out the door. Once I was outside, I began to 
cry. The tears were not for the loss of a man I barely knew, but for the pain of a 
childhood spent in fear of his violence, for the scars that he had left on me and my 
brothers and sisters, for the sadness and grief that had come with the absence of a 
loving father and the presence instead of this terrifying man. ( 125) 
The reader may surmise that Jordan resisted the violence of her own father in order 
to become a different !Gnd of citizen, one who sought to 'help' the vulnerable rather 
than to create them. While Jordan appears to hold that she is not dominated or 
defined by her relationship with her violent father, she is still affected by his 
absence, his shadow and alternative (125). Jordan takes up this position of the 
' loving father ' in relation to Aborigines, thus substantiating the absence that she 
grieves for. Her violent father operates as Other to this ' loving father'. 
Young points out that, within the logic of protection, dominant men are 'bad men ' 
while 'good men' are those who protect us, infantilised women and children, from 
them, aggressive masculine violators (4). This model positions women and children 
within an economy of paternalism, caught between the dominance of aggressive 
men and the protection of carers. Consequently, as Young points out, 'dominative 
masculinity in this way constitutes protective masculinity as its other ' (4). Building 
on the work of Mohanty and Narayan, Young makes the point that western feminists 
have utilised this framing to situate themselves as carers or ' loving protectors ' 
(Paisley), as opposed to aggressive masculine types . The logic of protection and 
patemalism requires conflict, threats of violence, in order that other forn1s of 
colonial domination pass as 'good'. It is this relationship between conflict and 
consensus, threat and protection, bad and good, which is the key to understanding 
how paternalism reproduces itself. It is not through total rupture, for the end to 
violence would equate to no role for the protector; where then would whiteness go? 
In terms of Australian colonialism, this argument has a number of ramifications. 
Colonial paternalism situates itself as the good protector, precisely when it 
represents past violence as that to which it stands in apparent contrast. In Jordan 's 
references to the 'sins of the father', it appears that she too takes up this rhetoric of 
feminine care versus masculine violence, only to reveal its instability. The failure of 
the ' loving father' to ' help ' is positioned in the memoir as an Aboriginal failure as 
much as the failure of whites, who do not realise that the nation is not a family. The 
death of the father/s - Jordan rhetorically kills offthe 'loving father' in Balanda by 
her rejection of protection - is recounted in the midst of an episode in which Jordan 
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is sexually harassed and stalked by an Aboriginal man. This leaves her very 
frightened and she eventually has to leave her flat. The domestic violence that she 
recalls from her childhood and the violence threatened by the Aboriginal man are 
both instantly recognisable as requiring protection against. But as Jordan discovers, 
the rhetoric of protection is closely aligned to the violence that it opposes. In 
response to Archie's offer to build a wire mesh screen around her flat, Jordan 
responds: 'I didn't want to live in a cage. But I did want to be safe' (122). The point 
here is not that the harassment is like a cage, but to show that these terms, violence 
and protection, are twins; they operate, double-helix like, at the heart of patemalism 
itself, splitting, doubling and coming together again and again. 
The colonial paternalism expressed by Jordan is c01runitted to change, to remedy 
and redeem, to participate in a rupture with that past and to be the loving father as 
opposed to the violent one. Its commitment reflects the idea that responsibility for 
historic injustice is inherited along ' family lines ' (Thompson) . But in a country 
where whites assume the position of cultural managers , such inheritances can 
include patemalistic interventions. Patemalism attaches itself to the past and to 
projected 'sins of the father', drawing it closer to the violation it is committed to 
protect others from. It is dependent on constructing the ' problems ' of colonialism as 
located with particular elements (for instance 'white invasion' in the past, or the 
'mother country') rather than with the ongoing structure of colonisation. This suits 
the logic of protection yet again, for it is not a discourse that seeks to alter the 
structure; rather, it attempts to install a complementary fom1 of disciplinary power, a 
biopolitical power, which seeks to maintain life in a particular form. The constant 
division or mitosis of violation/protection is the dynamic behind patemalism. 
Between violation and protection there is complicity; it is complicity that joins these 
two things together, complicity in the sense of being an accomplice, and in the sense 
of complexity of involvement. 
Jordan's 'shame' as a white Australian critic of colonialism does not do justice to 
the structural nature of colonialism: ' I was disgusted with myself for buying into it 
and made an effort to stop ' (139). Shame is, as Sara Ahmed notes , a temporary, 
fleeting thing that suggests a getting over in order to enter into pride (1 07, 109- 1 0) . 
In Craft for a Dry Lake Kim Mahood confesses her shame in using her skin name 
'to claim a certain credibility among urban friends for my knowledge of Aboriginal 
society ' (125). Mahood and Jordan contextualise the ' shame ' of their possessive 
interest in Aboriginality, where the white knowers of Aboriginality congratulate 
themselves on their capacity to know the Other, without the Other ever having to 
speak. Rather than shame, it might be more useful to think of complicity. 
Complicity appeals to the structural as much to the personal , momentary condition 
of response-ability (Probyn-Rapsey; see also Sanders) . 
Patemalism operates as a key tem1 in Australian postcolonialism and maintains 
this presence by its iterability. Key to the reproduction of patemalism is the ways in 
101 
FIONA PROBYN-RAPSEY 
which it draws on the ' nation as family ' trope, a trope that is deeply embedded in 
our political and moral imaginations (Lakoff) , and one that, importantly, supports its 
biopolitical nature. Patemalism unites love, affection and power in a way that 
sometimes insulates it from critique. And patemalism necessitates the identification 
of repressive elements, the ' sins of the father', the 'bad old days', in order to situate 
itself as a preferred model. This dynamic produces iterability, repetition with a 
difference. Balanda makes clear that the desired rupture between violence and 
protection is continually deferred, and that the terms lie in a complicit relationship 
within patemalism. 
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